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Staples and the New Industrialism in 
the Growth of Post-Confederation Halifax* 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the course of urban 
development in the Maritimes diverged sharply from the path followed by 
central Canada. Because Maritime cities grew at slower rates and with fewer 
opportunities than their Ontario and Quebec counterparts, they remained much 
smaller in size and less diverse in their functional activities.1 Scholars are now 
attempting to explain this divergence. Several have emphasized the differentiat-
ing role of the entrepreneur. T.W. Acheson, for example, has argued recently 
that the Maritime entrepreneurial class, comprised mostly of a long-established 
mercantile elite, was unable to meet the challenge of the new industrialism of the 
late nineteenth century. The limited industrial experience of these 
community-oriented businessmen and their lack of access to capital markets led 
eventually to the collapse of the region's urban-industrial base and to its almost 
complete takeover by central Canadian interests.2 A second group of scholars 
has stressed the vulnerability of the region to external forces. The demise of both 
shipbuilding and the carrying trade as a consequence of changing shipping 
technologies adversely affected the economic growth of Yarmouth and Saint 
John.3 At the same time, forces of continentalism in the guise of freight rate 
equalization policies, business reorganization and concentration, and changing 
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grant from the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Fund, Mount Allison University, 
supported some of the research and is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 For an overview and comparative analysis of regional urbanization in Canada, see R.E. Preston, 
"The Evolution of Urban Canada: The Post-1867 Period", in R.M. Irving, ed., Readings in 
Canadian Geography (3rd ed., Toronto, 1978), pp. 19-46. 
2 T.W. Acheson, "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-1910", 
Acadiensis, I (Spring 1972), pp. 3-28. For other studies focusing on this theme, see D. Frank, 
"The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the Rise and Fall of the British Empire Steel 
Corporation", Acadiensis, VI (Autumn 1977), pp. 3-34; and D.A. Sutherland, "The Personnel 
and Policies of the Halifax Board of Trade, 1890-1914", in Lewis R. Fischer and Eric W. Sager, 
eds., The Enterprising Canadians: Entrepreneurs and Economic Development in Eastern 
Canada, 1820-1914 (St. John's, 1979). 
3 D. Alexander, "The Port of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, 1840-1889", in K. Matthews and G. 
Panting, eds., Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region (St. John's, 1978); and E. 
McGahan, "The Port of Saint John, New Brunswick, 1867-1911", Urban History Review, No. 3 
(1976), pp. 3-13. 
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market potentials all robbed industrial towns such as New Glasgow and 
Amherst of access to central and western Canadian markets, thereby crippling 
their economic base.4 A final group, represented by economic historians such as 
S.A. Saunders and David Alexander, has argued that Maritime economic 
development has been restricted by the marginal quality and poor management 
of the region's resource base.5 Although these studies focus almost exclusively 
on the plight of individual staples to the neglect of the urban process, 
nevertheless they suggest that the resource hinterland of the Maritimes was too 
limited in size, variety, and richness to support intensive and sustained urban 
development. 
This essay extends these enquiries into Maritime urban development. It offers 
a theoretical perspective on regional urban growth in Canada and examines the 
industrialization of Halifax in the post-Confederation period down to the eve of 
World War I to show how the regional staple economy of the Maritimes and the 
comparative advantages of other Canadian cities adversely influenced the 
course of urban-industrial development in the Nova Scotian capital. 
There can be little doubt that the growth of cities in the nineteenth century 
was influenced by staple production.6 Across Canada, regional urban systems 
first emerged when foreign and inter-regional demand fostered increased staple 
flows and where the commodities were sufficiently bulky, weighty and 
perishable to require urban-based linkages in the transport, manufacturing, and 
service sectors. As late as World War I, nearly one-third of Canada's industrial 
output was based directly upon primary production, and the indirect impact of 
staples on the secondary and tertiary sectors must have been considerable.7 By 
this time, the growth of Canadian cities was also influenced by what Harold 
Innis has termed the "discrepancy between the centre and the margin",8 that is, 
4 E.R. Forbes, "Misguided Symmetry: The Destruction of Regional Transportation Policy for the 
Maritimes", in D.J. Bercuson, ed., Canada and the Burden of Unity (Toronto, 1977) and B. 
Archibald, "The Development of Underdevelopment in the Atlantic Provinces" (unpublished 
MA thesis, Dalhousie University, 1971). 
5 D. Alexander, "Economic Growth in the Atlantic Region, 1880-1940", Acadiensis, VIII 
(Autumn 1978), pp. 47-76; R.E. Caves and R. Holton, The Canadian Economy: Prospect and 
Retrospect (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. 140-94; and S.A. Saunders, The Economic History of 
the Maritime Provinces: A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial 
Relations (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939), pp. 14-33 and 90-9. 
6 This theme has been taken up in several recent studies by Canadian geographers. See D.M. Ray, 
Canada: The Urban Challenge of Growth and Change (Ottawa, The Ministry of State for 
Urban Affairs, 1974), pp. 23-6; and J.W. Simmons, "The Growth of the Canadian Urban 
System", Research Paper 65 (Toronto, 1974). 
7 Calculated from data presented in A.G. Green, Regional Aspects of Canada's Economic 
Growth (Toronto, 1971), p. 86. 
8 H.A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto, 1957), p. 385. 
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by continentalism — the polarizing effects of core-periphery development. In 
1910, nearly 70 per cent of the country's non-primary production was 
concentrated in the rapidly industrializing towns and cities of Ontario and 
Quebec.9 The effects of this concentration were considerable. Quite simply, the 
accumulated comparative advantages of heartland cities restricted urban 
development in the periphery. 
Thus, a framework for examining the growth of Canadian cities is of 
necessity derived from the staple theory of regional economic growth and the 
core-periphery or heartland-hinterland conceptualization of regions.10 The core 
supplies those factors of production (capital, labour, technology and 
entrepreneurship) that are used to develop the resource base of the periphery. In 
return, the periphery exports staple commodities (those raw materials or 
resource intensive goods occupying a central position in the region's exports) to 
the source of demand in the core. Within this context, heartland and hinterland 
cities function as intermediaries (see Figure 1). As intermediaries, their 
economic base is characterized by functions based on handling the factors of 
production which include trading, transportation, manufacturing, and financial 
and business activities. However, the degree of specialization and the composi-
tion of economic sectors differs in heartland and hinterland cities. It is unlikely 
that the hinterland city will have a fully diversified economic base. Depending 
upon the type and distribution of resources found within the periphery, cities 
here will function mainly as resource towns, as central places, or as break-in-
bulk points. In the heartland city manufacturing is emphasized because the 
core's accessibility to national markets creates an initial advantage." The 
external economies of concentrated human resources also favour heartland 
cities as financial and business headquarters. 
Further differences between heartland and hinterland cities become evident by 
examining the circular and cumulative process of urban growth. The stimuli for 
growth are the regional economy's urban-based functions. They set in motion 
the multiplier effect which spawns additional basic and non-basic economic 
9 Green, Regional Aspects of Canada s Economic Growth, p. 86. 
10 R.E. Caves, "Vent for Surplus Models of Trade and Growth", in R.E. Baldwin et ai, eds., 
Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments (Chicago, 1965); J. Friedmann, "Regional 
Economic Policy in Developing Areas", Papers and Proceedings of the Regional Science 
Association, XII (1963), pp. 41-61; J.M. Gilmour, Spatial Evolution of Manufacturing.Southern 
Ontario 1851-1891 (Toronto, 1972), pp. 12-25; and M.H. Watkins, "A Staple Theory of 
Economic Growth", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 28 (1963), pp. 
141-58. I have explored some of the ideas presented in this section in a related paper: L.D. 
McCann, "Urban Growth in a Staple Economy: The Emergence of Vancouver as a Regional 
Metropolis, 1886-1914", in L.J. Evenden, ed., Vancouver: Western Metropolis (Victoria, 1978). 
11 A.R. Pred, "Industrialization, Initial Advantage and American Metropolitan Growth", 
Geographical Review, 55 (1965), pp. 165-80. 
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Figure 1: The Process of Urban Growth in a Heartland-Hinterland Economic 
System 
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activity. Manufacturing is the leading sector in most heartland cities and the 
creator of employment and population growth. This sector comprises manufac-
turers of primary, consumer and producer goods. Primary manufacturing 
industries are indicative of forward linkage effects, while the consumer goods 
destined for industrial markets are the result of backward connections.12 
Manufacturers of consumer and producer goods are minimal in the hinterland 
because the heartland can meet national market demands more efficiently. The 
stimulus for growth in the hinterland city is the wholesale-trading complex, 
particularly if the regional economy depends upon the staple trade. 
Ultimately, the sustained growth and development of all cities depends upon 
local, regional or extra-regional thresholds, that is, upon the attainment of 
minimum income or population levels. Historically, heartland cities have 
attained higher thresholds more easily than hinterland cities and therefore have 
grown larger in size.13 If it is accepted that industrialization was the "engine of 
growth" in the late nineteenth century, why did hinterland cities fail to 
industrialize? The main reasons, assessed most succinctly by Pred and by 
Müller, are the accumulation of external economies; transport and route 
developments; entrepreneurial behaviour, particularly combination practices, 
ologopolistic competition and inhibiting mercantile traditions; and initial 
advantages in the guise of site and situation, relative accessibility, factor 
immobility, and labour and capital availability.14 These conditions placed 
hinterland cities at a comparative disadvantage against their heartland 
competitors. 
An additional factor is the differentiating effect of the regional resource base. 
This factor is of particular significance for the cities of a staple economy. The 
economic base of a city which is dependent upon one particular staple can be 
seriously eroded by anything from resource depletion without substitution, loss 
of competitive position through inelastic foreign demand, and adverse shifts in 
demand resulting from competition from cheaper or synthetic sources of supply, 
to simply changes in taste. Differential urban growth is also related to the 
residentiary effects of individual staples.15 Some staples, such as the cod fishery, 
12 Backward linkages relate to inducements to invest in the production of goods required by the 
export sector; forward linkages relate to opportunities for investment in industries using the 
output of the export industry as an input; and final-demand linkages describe the inducement to 
invest in consumer goods industries producing for factors in the export sector. See Watkins, "A 
Staple Theory of Economic Growth", pp. 145-6. 
13 A. R. Pred, The Spatial Dynamics of U.S. Urban-Industrial Growth (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 
pp. 16-24 and 33-7. 
14 Ibid., pp. 46-83; and E.K. Müller, "Regional Urbanization and the Selective Growth of Towns in 
North America Regions", Journal of Historical Geography, 3 (1977), pp. 21-40. 
15 The term residentiary is used to designate secondary and tertiary industries which locate in urban 
areas to serve the local or regional market. See D.A. North, "Location Theory and Regional 
Economic Growth", Journal of Political Economy, 58 (1955), pp. 243-58. 
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have traditionally produced only weakly developed linkage effects.16 Others 
generate social structures which inhibit supportive community development, as 
in the case of the company town.17 The type and strength of linkages with other 
economic sectors, particularly of the final-demand variety, are affected by 
labour force participation and income levels. The availability of labour for 
residentiary industries is further weakened by competition from other resource 
industries and by the limited skills of a resource-oriented labour force. The 
extent of domestic savings derived from the resource base also influences the 
degree to which staple entrepreneurs invest in other sectors of the economy.18 In 
each situation, the location, type and size of the resource base, together with the 
nature of the control associated with the staple economy, directly affects urban 
growth. Moreover, the number and size of urban places, and certainly the timing 
of urban development, is critically related to the demand for staple commodities 
and to the supply of scarce factors of production. These, in turn, are influenced 
by the social, political and economic conditions of the metropolitan economy. 
Urban development in the hinterland is thus governed largely by external forces. 
One city adversely affected by these factors during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was Halifax. Although in the 1871 to 1921 period its 
population almost doubled from 29,582 to 58,372, Halifax dropped from 
Canada's fifth ranking city to its eleventh (see Figure 2). Concurrent with the 
decline of Halifax are other trends: the general instability of Canada's urban 
system, particularly between 1881 and 1911 when there was considerable 
reordering of ranks; Central Canada's absolute and proportional increase of 
cities of 10,000 people or more; and the initial appearance and rise to 
prominence of cities in the western periphery. Halifax is only one example of the 
widening urban disparity between the eastern margin and the rest of Canada. 
Indeed, by the end of World War I, seven Canadian cities had won higher ranks 
and rates of growth: Hamilton, Ottawa and London in Central Canada; and 
Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver in the western periphery. In the 
Maritimes, Halifax's downward path was not unique. Saint John and 
Charlottetown fared worse. The only exceptions to this pattern were Moncton, 
an important distribution point on the Intercolonial Railway, and Glace Bay 
and Sydney, the centres of coal and steel production in Cape Breton. 
It is apparent that as the heartland-hinterland process emerged during the late 
nineteenth century, it changed regional development patterns and thereby 
16 R. Ommer, "The Cod Fishery and a Theory of Settlement Development" (unpublished paper, 
McGill University, Department of Geography, 1976). 
17 L. D. McCann, Canadian Resource Towns: A Geographical Perspective, forthcoming. 
18 L.R. MacDonald, "Merchants against Industry: An Idea and its Origins", Canadian Historical 
Review, 56 (1975), pp. 263-81. 
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created alternative bases for urban growth beyond those of staple production. 
This restructuring can be analyzed by the statistical technique of factor 
analysis.19 By this procedure, measures of provincial labour force participation 
in 1881 and 1911 were summarized to outline the structural dimensions of the 
Canadian economic system (see Table 1 and Figure 3).20 It is apparent that 
shortly after Confederation staple industries dominated the economy (Factor 
I). Agricultural production characterized Ontario and Quebec as well as 
Manitoba and Prince Edward Island. In British Columbia and the other 
Maritime provinces, fishing and mining absorbed a considerable share of the 
labour force. Of secondary importance to the Canadian economy, but certainly 
a harbinger of subsequent development, was a structural dimension of urban 
activity. Indeed, trading activities, government service, manufacturing and 
construction combined in 1881 to distinguish the industrializing core from the 
periphery (Factor II). Transportation comprised Factor III of the labour force 
analysis. It proved to be more important at the margins of the country than 
elsewhere. Even by 1881, therefore, the framework of the heartland-hinterland 
paradigm was well in place.21 By 1911, it was an established pattern. Core-
periphery contrasts, based on differences between urban-oriented activities and 
agricultural production, comprised the basic dimension of the economy (Factor 
I). Specialized secondary and tertiary activities were concentrated in Ontario 
and Quebec where during an earlier phase of agricultural production they had 
been merely supplemental. The agricultural frontier had shifted west to the 
newly created provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. Other forms of staple 
production were still important, but only on a restricted regional basis (Factor 
II). In the peripherally located provinces of Nova Scotia and British Columbia, 
mining and fishing comprised important elements of the economic base. These 
resource activities and government services comprise Factor III. The develop-
ment of forestry, mining and other staples required extensive government invest-
ment in transportation facilities, which was most pronounced at the margin in 
19 Michael Ray has employed the same technique to examine Canada in 1961. He concluded that 
core-periphery contrasts were particularly significant: "secondary manufacturing and service 
activity have gravitated toward the center, leaving hinterland areas reliant on primary activities 
which tend to play a diminishing role in national economies". "The Spatial Structure of 
Economic and Cultural Differences: A Factorial Ecology of Canada", Papers and Proceedings 
of the Regional Science Association, 23 (1969), p. 8. 
20 To ensure comparability over time, these labour force data have been reclassified according to 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Standard Industrial Classification Manual (Ottawa, 
Queen's Printer, 1960). 
21 This analysis confirms the aspatial examination of the evolution of Canada's economic system 
contained in O.J. Firestone, "Development of Canada's Economy, 1850-1900", in Trends in the 
American Economy in the Nineteenth Century, Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 24 
(Princeton, 1960), pp. 217-46. 
Acadiensis 55 
Table 1 
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN SPACE ECONOMY, 1881 and 1911 
(Variable Loadings on Varimax Rotated Factors') 
Labour Force Group2 
Agriculture 
Fishing and trapping 
Forestry 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade 
Transportation 
Personal and 
professional services 
Government 
% Total Variance 
% Accumulated Variance 
I 
.734 
-.905 
-.850 
-.624 
.944 
49.9 
29.9 
1881 
Factor 
II 
.579 
.742 
.719 
.938 
.966 
25.6 
75.5 
III 
.927 
13.2 
88.7 
I 
-.763 
.930 
.666 
.669 
.876 
56.3 
56.3 
1911 
Factor 
II 
-.949 
.779 
.500 
20.8 
77.1 
III 
-.578 
.585 
.545 
.974 
.906 
12.7 
89.8 
Source: Calculated by the author. 
'Only variable loadings >.500 are indicated. 
Percentage of provincial labour force by industrial groups. 
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British Columbia and Alberta.22 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. For cities in Central 
Canada whose core position gave them access to national markets, the whole-
saling, transportation and resource processing functions of a staple economy 
were supplemented by the secondary manufacturing and business activities of 
the new industrialism. By contrast, the opportunity for diversification was 
limited in the cities of the Maritimes. For example, in 1910 the gross value of 
production of Nova Scotia's primary sector totalled only $45.3 million, or a 
mere 17 per cent of Ontario's $261.9 million. Disparity in the secondary and 
tertiary sectors was even greater. Nova Scotia's production in these spheres was 
$68.9 million, only 12 per cent of Ontario's $583.6 million output.23 Even 
allowing for differences in population size and per capita comparisons, the 
opportunities for concentrated urban development were still limited. Halifax did 
indeed function at the margin of development. 
Until the mid-nineteenth century Halifax's growth had been hesitant, 
conditioned by fluctuating demands for staples and by changes in Great 
Britain's foreign and trading policies.24 Saint John surpassed Halifax in popula-
tion during the 1830s and in 1861 the differential was 27,317 to 25,026.25 
Nonetheless, Halifax was still a leading commercial entrepôt and military and 
administrative outpost in British North America. At mid-century, it handled 
about three-quarters of Nova Scotia's imports and about two-thirds of its 
exports.26 It traded fish, forest and agricultural products in exchange for British 
and American consumer and durable goods and for West Indian sugar, rum and 
molasses. Approximately one-half of Nova Scotia's merchant marine was 
registered to businessmen of the capital.27 Accordingly, the waterfront contained 
various urban activities related to the wholesale-trading complex such as the 
packaging and processing of staples, transportation services, and the provision-
ing and repair activities associated with freight shipment. 
Halifax was also the leading manufacturing centre of Nova Scotia and this 
22 H.G.S. Aitken, "Government and Business in Canada: An Interpretation", Business History 
Review, 37-38 (1964), pp. 4-21. 
23 Green, Regional Aspects of Canada's Economic Growth, p. 86. 
24 These themes and the role of the Halifax merchantocracy in their development are examined in a 
most comprehensive study by D.A. Sutherland, "The Merchants of Halifax, 1815-1850: A 
Commercial Class in Pursuit of Metropolitan Status" (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Toronto, 1975). 
25 Canada, Census of Canada, 1870-71, vol. 4, Table 1, pp. 232 and 344. 
26 Novascotian (Halifax), extra, 14 February 1854. 
27 Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, Journals and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1851, 
Appendix 78, Abstract of Provincial Shipping Tonnage. See also E. W. Sager, "The Shipping 
Fleet of Halifax, 1820-1905" (paper presented at the Atlantic Canada Studies Conference, 
University of New Brunswick, April, 1978). 
58 Acadiensis 
activity absorbed about 22 per cent of the city's labour force in 1861 (see Table 
2). Despite this pre-eminence, manufacturing was still pre-industrial in 
character. Since its structure was only weakly developed and its capitalization 
was slight, most manufacturers were small in scale, based on crafts production 
and catered principally to the local market.28 This degree of underdevelopment 
was not due to the antagonistic attitude of the business community toward 
manufacturing. In fact, industrialization had been made an important platform 
in a programme of civic improvement. Both the Society for the Encouragement 
of Trade and Manufacturers, formed in 1839,29 and its successor, the Nova 
Scotia Society for Developing and Encouraging Home Manufacturers, 
established shortly after Confederation in 1870,30 campaigned vigorously for 
industrial development. But as the census data of the period indicate, their 
efforts brought only limited success. Large-scale manufacturing of the type 
found in Great Britain and the larger cities of the northeastern United States 
was not established in Halifax. For example, the boot and shoe industry, 
Halifax's largest manufacturing employer in 1871, claimed only 371 employees 
dispersed in 29 places of work.31 In this respect Halifax was typical of other 
mid-nineteenth-century Canadian cities. They were essentially commercial in 
character and oriented to staple hinterlands; their complete industrial 
transformation awaited the last decades of the century.32 
28 These generalizations are based on the following table compiled from data in the Census of 
Nova Scotia, 1860-61, Appendix 8, pp. 287-91. They can be compared to Pred, Spatial 
Dynamics, p. 170. 
THE STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURING IN HALIFAX, 1861 
(Classified by Relationship to the Wholesale-Trading Complex) 
Establishments Value Added 
Function 
Entrepôt 
Commerce-serving 
Local market 
Construction 
Other (gas factory) 
Totals 
No. 
9 
5 
18 
7 
1 
40 
% 
22.5 
12.5 
45.0 
17.5 
2.5 
100.0 
Amount 
36,800 
39,400 
69,000 
25,100 
180,000 
350,300 
% 
10.5 
11.2 
19.7 
7.2 
51.4 
100.0 
29 Society for the Encouragement of Trade and Manufactures, Halifax, N.S., Rules and 
Regulations (Halifax, 1839). 
30 Nova Scotia Society for Developing and Encouraging Home Manufactures, Address to the 
People of Nova Scotia. . .Constitution of the Society (Halifax, 1870). 
31 Canada, Census of Canada, 1870-71, vol. 3, Tables 28-54. 
32 G.W. Bertram, "Economic Growth in Canadian Industry, 1870-1915: The Staple Model and the 
Take-Off Hypothesis", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 29 (1963), 
pp. 159-84. 
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Table 2 
THE CHANGING ECONOMY OF HALIFAX, 1861 - 1911 
(Distribution of Labour Force by Industrial Groups) 
1861 1881 1911 
Industrial Group1 
Primary 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Trade 
Transportation 
Finance 
Insurance and real 
estate 
Personal and pro-
fessional services 
Government2 
Unspecified 
Commercial clerks 
Labourers 
Others 
Total Labour Force 
No. 
292 
1,379 
802 
819 
666 
13 
— 
840 
141 
312 
1,072 
— 
6,338 
% 
4.6 
21.8 
12.7 
12.9 
10.5 
.2 
— 
13.3 
2.2 
4.9 
16.9 
— 
100.0 
No. 
291 
2,242 
1,088 
1,232 
1,205 
49 
60 
3,900 
277 
1,251 
1,014 
350 
12,959 
% 
2.2 
17.4 
8.4 
9.3 
9.5 
.4 
.5 
30.2 
3.1 
9.6 
7.8 
2.6 
100.0 
No. 
243 
2,750 
1,034 
1,297 
2,205 
223 
220 
3,817 
1,706 
1,676 
2,738 
— 
17,909 
% 
1.4 
15.4 
5.8 
7.2 
12.3 
1.2 
1.2 
21.3 
9.5 
9.4 
15.3 
— 
100.0 
Sources: Nova Scotia, Census of Nova Scotia, 1860-61, Appendix 5, pp. 
190-199; 
Canada, Census of Canada, 1881, vol. 2, Table 14, pp. 232-243; and 
Canada, Census of Canada, 1911, vol. 6, pp. 326-334. 
1
 To ensure comparability over time, the labour force data for each year were 
reclassified according to : Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Standard 
Industrial Classification Manual (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1960). 
2
 Excludes army and navy personnel of Great Britain (1861 and 1881) and 
Canada (1911). 
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The new industrialism was spurred by a combination of fiscal policies set in 
the guise of protective tariff schedules referred to collectively as the National 
Policy. Introduced in 1879, by the late 1880s these measures had encouraged the 
development of a number of manufacturing industries in Halifax which 
previously had either not existed or existed in only limited form. Several city 
foundries increased their capitalization to produce engines, tools, spikes, nails 
and construction materials for the expanding resource sector. More signifi-
cantly, the mercantile community of Halifax responded favourably to these 
measures. Its most notable ventures were the Nova Scotia Sugar Refinery, 
capitalized initially in 1879 at $300,000, and the Halifax Cotton Company, 
formed in 1881 and also supported by locally subscribed shares of more than 
$500,000." Both businesses were based on existing trading patterns with British 
West Indian suppliers.34 As a consequence of these and other efforts, manufac-
turing in Halifax advanced appreciably, nearly doubling in value between 1900 
and 1910 to achieve an annual level of production of more than $12 million.35 
With the aid of the National Policy and local entrepreneurial initiative, 
manufacturing had maintained its leading position over the other sectors of the 
economy. Yet Halifax could not claim hegemony in the Maritimes as a 
manufacturing centre. Sydney, Amherst, New Glasgow and Trenton in Nova 
Scotia and Saint John, Moncton, Marysville and Chatham in New Brunswick 
dominated several industrial categories.36 Nor^could Halifax claim to match the 
sizeable advances made by the cities of Central Canada. Of the 55 Canadian 
cities of 10,000 people or more in 1911, an overwhelming majority, 48 in fact, 
experienced higher rates of industrial growth between 1890 and 1910.37 Later, in 
the two years preceding the disastrous Halifax Explosion of 1917, the city's rate 
of increase did not reach even one per cent. By this time, its value of production 
had fallen to less than 5 per cent that of either Toronto or Montreal.38 Over the 
next decade, as freight rates climbed and mergers took effect, the decline 
33 Acheson, "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes", p. 7. 
34 Examination of the Mercantile Agency Reference Books of Dun, Wiman and Company and of 
R.G. Dun and Company for the 1879-1914 period revealed that few American and British 
industries set up branch plants in Halifax. Besides the mercantile community and the small 
industries that expanded operations, it was noted that migrants to the city from within the 
province, Great Britain and the United States did establish in Halifax small manufacturing 
industries. See, for example, the biographies of local businessmen in Our Dominion: Halifax 
(Toronto, 1887), pp. 40-117. 
35 Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Canada as a Field for British Branch Industries 
(Ottawa, King's Printer, 1922), p. 40. 
36 Acheson, "National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes", p. 5. 
37 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Canada Year Book, 1912 (Ottawa, King's Printer, 
1914), p. 224. 
38 Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Canada as a Field for British Branch 
Industries, p. 40. 
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became even more precipitous. Between 1920 and 1926, manufacturing employ-
ment in the city dropped from 7,171 to 3,287.39 
The process of industrialization in Halifax down to the eve of World War I 
thus presents a paradox. On the one hand, boosters could point to the substan-
tial number of newly established firms and to the sizeable gains in output, and 
could boast of the role of manufacturing as the city's leading employer. On the 
other, if they cared to, they might comment on the diminished relative 
importance of Halifax as a national manufacturing centre. This paradox is 
clearly demonstrated by the location quotient technique . By this method, the 
functional importance of any city can be accurately measured in comparison to 
other cities of an urban system. Using published occupation data from the 1881 
and 1911 census, reclassified to ensure comparability over time, the location 
quotient is defined as the proportion of the urban labour force in a given 
industry (or occupation) divided by the proportion in that industry of some 
larger benchmark economy. The index takes on a value of one if the proportions 
are equal; a value of more than one measures an over concentration in the urban 
area; and a value of less than one indicates an under concentration.40 From these 
measurements, it is clear that in absolute terms Halifax improved as a regional 
and national manufacturing centre over the 1881 to 1911 period (see Table 3). 
However, overshadowing this advance, cities in other regions bettered their 
standing relative to Halifax. For example, Halifax's national location quotient 
rose moderately from .79 to 1.14, but Hamilton's more than doubled from 1.21 
to 2.62. This trend was shared by all the heartland cities, emphasizing the 
concentration of industrial activity in southern Ontario and Quebec. 
Canadian industrialists in the late nineteenth century could pursue two 
manufacturing strategies: they could process staples and they could establish 
secondary industries. In Vancouver, manufacturers followed a strategy of staple 
processing so successfully that by 1911 nearly 2,800 workers or 5.5 per cent of 
the city's labour force worked in the forest products sector alone.41 In Saint John 
the percentage was smaller but no less significant. However, in Halifax in 1911, 
less than 200 workers of a total labour force of about 18,000 manufactured 
staple commodities.42 The explanation for this situation lies not in the weakness 
of local initiative, but in the distribution and character of the regional resource 
base which mitigated against the location of staple processing in Halifax. 
Theoretically, the most critical locational consideration in processing resources 
39 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Canada Year Book. 1922-23 (Ottawa, King's 
Printer, 1924), p. 438 and The Canada Year Book, 1928 (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1929), pp. 
453-4. 
40 A.M. Isserman, "The Location Quotient Approach to Estimating Regional Economic 
Impacts", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 43 (1977), pp. 33-41. 
41 McCann, "Urban Growth in a Staple Economy", p. 30. 
42 Canada, Census of Canada, 1911, vol. 6, Table 6, pp. 328-30. 
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Table 3 
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL MANUFACTURING LOCATION 
QUOTIENTS FOR HALIFAX AND SELECTED CANADIAN CITIES, 
1881 and 1911 
1911 
Regional National 
1.38 1.14 
1.89 1.55 
3.59 2.99 
1.35 1.79 
1.45 1.58 
1.36 1.80 
1.50 1.94 
2.03 2.62 
1.84 2.38 
Western Periphery 
Winnipeg 
Calgary 
Edmonton 
Vancouver 
Sources: The location quotients have been calculated from labour force data in 
Canada, Census of Canada, 1881, vol. 2, Table 14; and Canada, 
Census of Canada, 1911, vol. 6, Table 6. 
Region and City 
Eastern Periphery 
Halifax 
Saint John 
Sydney 
Central Canada 
Montreal 
Quebec 
Sherbrooke 
Toronto 
Hamilton 
London 
1881 
Regional 
1.04 
2.39 
2.00 
2.31 
2.18 
2.58 
2.39 
National 
.79 
.95 
.72 
.83 
1.02 
1.21 
1.11 
2.80 
2.45 
3.16 
.94 
.96 
.83 
1.08 
1.01 
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is usually the weight reduction factor. Manufacturing plants locate near the 
source of a raw material to eliminate the higher transportation costs of shipping 
this material en masse to a market. Of course, there are other locational 
considerations: the differential in freight rates for shipping either commodities 
or finished products; the specific material input requirements of vertically 
integrated (and often multinational) corporations; the specific amount of on-site 
processing required to meet external market demands; the level of technology 
available to the industry; power requirements for processing purposes; and the 
spatial biases of government tariff and fiscal policies. 
Examination of Nova Scotia's fishery and forestry industries confirms 
Halifax's inability to engage in staple processing.43 Unlike the salmon catch of 
British Columbia which was usually canned before export, much of the Nova 
Scotia fishery was exported in either a green or dried state. Accordingly, only a 
limited amount of processing took place. The similar distribution pattern of the 
primary and secondary phases of the industry indicate that this processing was 
indeed located near the source of the staple itself, away from Halifax (see Figure 
4). The largest quantities of fish came from the rich bank areas lying offshore 
from the province's southeastern counties of Yarmouth, Shelburne, Queens, 
Lunenburg and Halifax, and from those fishing banks situated to the east and 
south of Cape Breton Island. Here, with the exception of firms interested 
principally in the fresh fish trade, most canning, curing and freezing establish-
ments were organized in small individual units.44 The largest centres associated 
with the secondary phase were Digby, Yarmouth, Wedgeport, Lunenburg, 
Shelburne and Canso.45 Few processing plants were in evidence along Halifax's 
waterfront. Within surrounding Halifax County, they were dispersed widely in 
the small fishing villages which dotted the coast. Although the fishery therefore 
added little to the primary manufacturing base of Halifax's economy before 
World War I,46 the city's wholesale-trading complex did control an important 
share of the export trade and even segments of the processing sector. This 
indicates that business acumen was not to blame for the manufacturing deficit. 
At least fifteen to twenty mercantile houses dealt directly in the fishery in any 
one year.47 Some of these managed branches throughout the Maritimes. A. 
43 The other major staple industries of the province, agriculture and mining, are not found 
immediately adjacent to Halifax, and for this reason were excluded from this analysis. Halifax 
did provide tertiary services for these industries. 
44 Saunders, The Economic History of the Maritime Provinces, p. 78. 
45 Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, Journals and Proceedings of the House of Assembly of Nova 
Scotia, 1911, Appendix 22, Industrial Opportunities in Nova Scotia, Canada. 
46 The present concentration of fish processing in Halifax did not begin to take place until the 
mid-1930s when R.P. Bell established the forerunner of National Sea Foods Products. See C. 
Cox, Canadian Strength (Toronto, 1946), p. 35. 
47 M c Alpine's Halifax Directory, 1879-1914 (Halifax, 1880-1915). 
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Wilson and Son owned a freezing plant at Canso in Guysborough County. 
Robin, Jones and Whitman, the largest dealer early in the twentieth century, 
operated either collection depots or processing plants at Canso, along the south 
shore in Lunenburg County, along Northumberland Strait in Cumberland 
County, and also in the Gaspé region.48 Other houses dealt solely in the fresh fish 
trade. 
By contrast, the investment and leadership of Halifax in the forest industry of 
the province was less important. The few sawmills of the city were small in scale 
and served mainly the local market. At Richmond, a one-time industrial suburb 
of Halifax located two miles north of the city's central docks, the wharf facilities 
of the federal government were equipped to handle lumber exports. However, 
other linkages with the regional hinterland were minimal. There were few 
supporting firms within the business community that provided brokerage, 
manufacturing, transportation or other services.49 This was surprising, because 
by World War I the primary phase of the industry had surpassed fishing in value 
of output and the making of log products was Nova Scotia's second highest 
valued manufacturing industry.50 
The lack of participation in the processing phases of the forest industry by 
Halifax is based on three locational factors. The supply of local water to power a 
sawmill was limited and in the immediate hinterland the forests comprised 
mainly stunted growth and cut-over areas." Elsewhere, access to the forest was 
limited because over 80 per cent of it was privately owned, chiefly in small farm 
woodlots or large holdings typically controlled by out-of-province interests.52 Of 
most significance was the province-wide distribution and export orientation of 
the industry which prevented centralization at Halifax. Traditionally, most 
counties and many of their settlements had shared in the logging, sawmilling and 
exporting phases of the industry. Some of these communities had further 
specialized in shipbuilding, although this industry had waned by the late 
nineteenth century.53 Early in the twentieth, the forest products industry was 
concentrated away from Halifax in the western counties of Annapolis, Digby, 
Yarmouth, Shelburne, Queens and Lunenburg and to the north in Hants, 
Colchester and Cumberland. Here, many sawmills were located along streams 
or small rivers at tidewater sites in order to generate power and reduce assembly 
48 The estimated pecuniary strength of Robin, Jones and Whitman in 1912 was about $500,000. 
R.G. Dun and Company, The Mercantile Agency Reference Book, 1912, p. 314. 
49 McAlpine's Halifax Directory, 1879-1914. 
50 Canada, Census of Canada, 1911, vol. 3, Table 12, pp. 12-14. 
51 "Report of the Board of Works", Annual Report of the City of Halifax 1891-92 (Halifax, 1892), 
pp. 59-86. 
52 Saunders, The Economic History of the Maritime Provinces, pp. 81-3. 
53 Ibid., pp. 14-22 and D. Erskine, "The Atlantic Region", in J. Warkentin, ed., Canada: A 
Geographical Interpretation (Toronto, 1968), pp. 244-6 and 253-70. 
66 Acadiensis 
and distribution costs. From a locational perspective, then, difficult lines of 
communication and high transportation costs made it impractical to channel 
raw materials over any long distance to Halifax for either processing or 
re-export. However, these costs did not entirely restrict the movement of 
finished products. This movement was usually confined to the winter season 
when Halifax did handle increased flows of lumber even from ice-bound areas as 
far away as northeastern New Brunswick.54 The completion of the Intercolonial 
Railway in the mid-1870s facilitated this export trade as well as reinforcing 
Halifax's function as a regional entrepôt. 
Hinterland cities are quite capable of growing to a substantial size either by 
engaging in resource processing or by servicing the resource hinterland. The 
growth of Vancouver before World War I is a case in point. But post-
confederation Halifax was not strategically located to benefit from the 
industrial stimuli offered by the regional staple economy. It could, and did, act 
as a commercial entrepôt for staple production, channelling a sizeable share of 
the region's fish, forest, mineral and agricultural products to external markets; 
but it could not function as a processing centre for these resources. The scattered 
distribution, the nature of external demand and the limited supply of the 
region's staples restricted Halifax's accessibility to this path of industrial 
development. 
The inability of Halifax to engage in staple processing thus provides a partial 
explanation for the city's more restricted course of industrial growth. Other 
reasons for Halifax's failure are related to its uncompetitive location at the 
margin. A comparative methodology, which establishes a clear picture of the 
structural characteristics of manufacturing in Halifax, in other towns and cities 
of Nova Scotia, and in major cities across Canada, isolates Halifax's short-
comings. From this analysis, it is possible to describe the external economies 
accruing to individual places. The changing production costs of manufacturing 
during the 1880 to 1910 period explain additional differentiating effects on 
urban-industrial growth. 
Most of the larger towns and cities of Nova Scotia participated in the new 
industrialism to such an extent that their industrial output at least doubled in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century. In a number of places the advance was 
considerably higher. Most notable were those specialized manufacturing centres 
located along the Intercolonial Railway whose rates of population growth were 
also the highest in the province (see Tables 4 and 5 and Figure 5). Indeed, the 
Intercolonial was itself an important agent in the initial industrialization of the 
region. To create traffic, its management had established a basic freight rate 
structure that was between 20 and 50 per cent lower than that of Ontario's. In 
54 The major ports that competed with Halifax for the lumber export trade were Parrsboro, 
Amherst, Sheet Harbour, Yarmouth and Pictou. 
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Figure 5: Changing Patterns of Manufacturing, 1880 and 1910 
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addition, it offered special rate concessions based upon "what the traffic would 
bear".55 On traffic destined for markets west of Montreal, Nova Scotian 
manufacturers, including certain Halifax industries such as the sugar 
refineries,56 enjoyed fixed arbitrary rates on the province to Montreal portion 
which gave them a stable relationship with competitors in Central Canada. The 
specific rate differential to the western provinces from Nova Scotia and from 
Ontario was about 8 cents per hundred weight.57 Although these westbound rates 
did assist regional manufacturers, eastbound rates were about 12 per cent higher 
which meant that it was costly to import industrial materials from Central 
Canada. This imbalance increased the production costs of those manufacturers 
dependent upon external suppliers. Halifax, located far from national suppliers, 
was at a particular disadvantage in securing cheap materials for its industrial 
base. 
Assisted by these freight tariffs and by other aspects of the National Policy, 
several of Nova Scotia's towns and cities did succeed in developing industries 
based on the particularistic circumstances of the region. "Busy" Amherst was 
led by enterprising captains of industry who capitalized on nearby coal 
resources to fuel their factories that produced railway cars, boots and shoes, 
engines, boilers, woollen goods and pianos.58 The industrial complex of New 
Glasgow-Trenton-Stellarton, similarly aided by local coal deposits, developed 
beyond its early focus on wooden shipbuilding to establish itself as a major 
producer of steel products. Here, the integrated Nova Scotia Steel and Coal 
Company, assisted by government subsidies, became one of Canada's largest 
corporations with over 6,000 employees working throughout the region, 
spawning linked industries which manufactured railway cars, springs, boilers, 
tools, mining equipment, and even rifle sights.59 In Cape Breton, the Sydney 
area contained Canada's leading coal, iron and steel complex. The locational 
incentives for this development were the largest accessible reserves of coal in 
Canada and iron ore easily transported from Wabana, Newfoundland.60 Of the 
cities situated away from the Intercolonial, only Yarmouth and Bridgewater 
ranked in the leading ten. Other towns of lesser rank were specialized in 
55 Forbes, "Misguided Symmetry", pp. 60-8; and R.A.C. Henry and Associates, Railway Freight 
Rates in Canada (Ottawa, 1939), pp. 266 and 268. 
56 Acheson, "National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes", p. 14. 
57 Nova Scotia, Journals and Proceedings. 191 /.Appendix 22, pp. 5-6. 
58 R. Lamy, "The Development and Decline of Amherst as an Industrial Centre" (unpublished BA 
thesis, Mount Allison University, 1930). 
59 Canadian Manufacture's Association, Evidence of the Industrial Ascendency of Nova Scotia 
(Halifax, 1914), n.p.; and The Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company (Halifax, 1912), pp. 5-7. 
60 P.T. McGrath, "The Manufacture of Iron and Steel in Cape Breton", The Engineering Journal, 
2 (1901), pp. 571-85. 
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character. Some, like Parrsboro and Canso, were limited to processing staples 
for export; others produced only for a local market.51 
There are also clear indications that economic factors other than accessibility 
to industrial materials assisted the progress of the specialized centres of Nova 
Scotia and placed Halifax at a comparative disadvantage. Increased economies 
of scale, reduced production costs and labour-saving technologies, all influenced 
selective urban-industrial growth. A comprehensive analysis of the 1880 to 1910 
period reveals that increases in plant size and the resulting reductions in material 
and labour costs were most pronounced in those places sharing in rapid 
growth.62 As illustrated by Table 5, Sydney, Amherst, Trenton and Sydney 
Mines best exemplify this pattern. The lower labour/power ratios of these places 
point to the ability of the specialized industries there to exploit labour-saving 
technologies. In addition, the centres in which manufacturing had advanced 
most particularly had the largest investments in physical plant and the highest 
capital/labour and capital/output ratios. This indicates that local industrialists 
successfully raised capital and used it efficiently to their advantage over 
competing centres. As T. W. Acheson has shown, the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal 
Company of New Glasgow was strongly supported by the Halifax financial 
community,63 and the economies of scale associated with this corporation's 
policy of vertical and horizontal integration apparently were considerable.64 This 
case is supported by the example of the Dominion Iron and Steel Company at 
Sydney. Started in the early 1890s as the Dominion Coal Company by 
American interests, it reorganized shortly thereafter to produce iron and steel 
and was subsequently controlled by Montreal and Toronto capitalists.65 It, too, 
was an integrated operation, possessing, for example, a substantial shipping 
fleet.66 
By World War I, the manufacturing structure of Halifax had deviated little 
from that established in the earlier phases of industrialization (see Table 6). 
There was no coal nearby to give an initial advantage for specialized manufac-
turing as elsewhere in the province. Other industrial materials were in short 
supply. Halifax did not even manufacture many producer goods for either the 
export sector or a national industrial market because of the weak linkage effects 
61 Nova Scotia, Journals and Proceedings. 1911, Appendix 22. 
62 The detailed tabulations of this analysis have not been reproduced here; they are available on re-
quest from the author. 
63 Acheson, "National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes", pp. 24-6. 
64 Canadian Manufacturers Association, Industrial Ascendency of Nova Scotia. 
65 Acheson, "National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes", p. 23. 
66 Part of this fleet was used to ship coal to the Montreal industrial and domestic market. Instead of 
returning empty to Cape Breton, these ships sometimes carried wholesale goods for distribution 
in Cape Breton. This practise cut into the trade of Halifax. F.W. Gray, Mining and Transporta-
tion (Toronto, 1909), pp. 111-28. 
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Table 6 
STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURING IN HALIFAX, 1911 
(By Number and Percentage of Employees) 
Manufacturing Industry 
Chemicals and drugs 
Clothing 
Food 
Iron and steel 
Leather and rubber goods 
Liquors and beverages 
Printers and engravers 
Textiles 
Vehicles for land 
Vehicles for water 
Wood products 
Others 
Totals 
Number 
47 
752 
669 
381 
177 
65 
279 
263 
254 
102 
179 
556 
3,724 
Percentage 
1.3 
20.2 
18.0 
10.2 
4.8 
1.7 
7.5 
7.1 
6.8 
2.7 
4.8 
14.9 
100.0 
Source: Canada, Census of Canada, 1911, vol. 6, Table 6. 
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imparted by the regional staples, and also because of the sparsely populated 
hinterland which prevented the city from sharing in the substantial economies of 
production inherent in a dense network of rural and urban settlement such as in 
Central Canada.67 Instead, the strength of Halifax's limited industrial structure 
was based on the manufacture of consumer products, such as refined sugar, 
confectionery goods, cotton cloth, boots and shoes and men's clothing. Some of 
these products entered national markets, a practise generally curtailed after the 
merger movement,68 but most were consumed only by the regional market. The 
presence of these manufacturers was clearly a function of Halifax's entrepôt 
status and its nodal position with the region. As a port and rail terminus, 
Halifax maintained some of the advantages associated with reduced transfer 
costs. Its nodal position also created the advantage of relative accessibility, 
making it at least possible for the producers of consumers goods in Halifax to 
gain access to regional markets. 
Structural indices point to additional explanations for Halifax's restricted 
industrial development. These indices isolate the external economies which 
favour urban-industrial growth in heartland economies and restrict such 
development in peripheral regions. Manufacturing in Halifax, compared to that 
in the other major industrial centres of Canada, was small in scale. The average 
capitalization, output, and number of workers employed in its factories was 
considerably less than that of almost every other city (Tables 7 and 8). Of 
particular significance, most factories in Halifax did not increase in size over the 
1880 to 1910 period to the same extent as their counterparts in Central 
Canada. Some firms did, such as Clayton and Son and Moirs, makers of men's 
clothing and confectionery products, respectively, because they were able to 
effect economies of scale with lower cost purchases of cotton, sugar and other 
materials from local companies.69 Without the advantage of scale economies, it 
was difficult to compensate for the distribution costs incurred by shipping to 
distant markets.70 High factor costs had generally hindered plant expansion. 
Even in 1880, Halifax's ratio of material costs/output was the highest of any 
city, and this situation did not change by 1910 (see Table 9). Most materials had 
to be either shipped from distant regional or national suppliers, incurring 
burdensome transportation costs. Also, the limited presence in Halifax of 
particular types of manufacturing meant that localization economies which are 
normally associated with bulk purchases were of no consequence. Nor could 
67 This theme is developed in J. Spelt, Urban Development in South Central Ontario (Toronto, 
1972): and Gilmour, Spatial Dynamics of Manufacturing. 
68 T.W. Acheson, "The Maritimes and Empire Canada", in Canada and the Burden of Unity, pp. 94-5. 
69 Both firms expanded considerably during the late nineteenth century. See the biographies of 
these firms in Halifax Board of Trade, The City of Halifax: Its Advantages and Facilities 
(Halifax, 1909). pp. 49-50 and 66-7. 
70 Pred, Spatial Dynamics, pp. 49-71. 
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these economies be realized even by production linkages with related industrial 
firms because, with few exceptions, these too were minimal in the city. 
To compensate for these high material costs, Halifax was forced to rely upon 
an efficient and productive factory system and on lower labour costs. As 
indicated by certain indices -^ capital/labour, capital/output and output/labour 
— Halifax did possess a comparatively efficient and productive industrial base 
and its labour costs were the lowest of any city.71 But these advantages were not 
sufficient. Only certain labour intensive industries, such as the clothing and 
cotton cloth manufacturers, were in a position to take advantage of these 
competitive costs, principally because they employed a less-skilled and less-
expensive female labour force.72 To establish firms requiring a skilled and 
expensive work force would have incurred still higher costs. As it was, only three 
heartland cities (Maissoneuve, Peterborough and Hull) maintained a higher 
ratio of materials and labour costs/output than Halifax.73 The external 
economies of the production process bear heavily on differential urban-
industrial growth, particularly the availability to cities of such factor inputs as 
less expensive industrial materials, labour-saving technologies, and capital 
financing. The comparative advantages of heartland cities, and even of some 
Nova Scotian centres, therefore restricted the location of secondary manufac-
turing in Halifax. The city was at a clear disadvantage in overcoming the high 
costs of obtaining industrial materials and in distributing finished products to 
distant markets. Without these markets, it was difficult to initiate a new round 
of industrial growth, and the circular and cumulative process of growth was 
accordingly curtailed. 
The problems of the peripheral industrial location of Halifax and of the city's 
vulnerability to the forces of continentalism were fully recognized by local 
businessmen and civic officials. In 1906 the Board of Trade appraised the 
industrial situation and confessed "we may as well face these difficulties 
fairly".74 The Board then listed the critical obstacles to manufacturing develop-
ment: the high cost of living, the need for cheaper power, and the distance from 
suppliers of materials and from markets. The high cost of rents, food and fuel 
was blamed for creating a shortage of skilled labour by driving away both 
'provincials' and foreign immigrants.75 There was little to compensate for 
71 For example, in Halifax in 1901 an electrician earned 150 per hour, whereas in Toronto the 
comparable rate was 250. M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of 
Canada (Toronto, 1965), pp. 86-7. 
72 Canada, Census of Canada, 1911, vol. 3, Table 9, pp. 230-1. 
73 "Nova Scotia is a coal producing province, yet Halifax has to pay $4.50 for a ton of coal making 
it higher than in almost any other place". The Suburban, vol. 3, No. 50 (13 January 1906), p. 6. 
74 Halifax Board of Trade, The Forty-First Annual Report of the Halifax Board of Trade for the 
Year 1906 (Halifax, 1907), p. 11. 
75 The Suburban (13 January 1906), p. 6. 
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Halifax's location at the margin — the tyranny of location — other than the 
advantage offered by "the year round commerce of our port".76 
But many cities did attempt to compensate for locational disadvantages by 
offering economic inducements to entice industry. In the late nineteenth century 
these bonuses were of many types, including the guarantee of a bond issue, 
property tax exemption, and direct grants of cash, land and even water.77 
Halifax, however, could offer few of these incentives because of its limited 
supply of industrial land, its serious shortage of water, and its restricted tax 
base.78 The latter was the principal reason. Over one-third of the value of real 
property in the city was exempt from taxation because it was owned by various 
government and religious organizations.79 This fact placed a considerable 
burden on the other land uses. To meet a continually rising civic debt, the city 
taxed not only private property, but also (despite the objections of mercantile 
interests) the value of goods held in local warehouses. To have granted bonuses, 
thereby forcing taxes to rise still further, quite obviously would have angered 
some local interest groups. As a consequence, bonusing was used sparingly. 
When it was practised, it usually aided those manufacturers aligned with the 
mercantile community. In this way, bonuses were given in the 1880s to the 
Halifax Cotton Factory, the Nova Scotia Sugar Refinery, and the Halifax 
Graving Dock Company.80 After 1900, a bonus successfully enticed the Silliker 
Car Works away from Amherst, but a long-standing search for a steel ship-
building enterprise had failed to materialize by World War I.81 
By examining regional urban growth in Canada within the framework of the 
staple theory of economic development and the heartland-hinterland 
conceptualization of regions, it becomes obvious why Halifax diverged from the 
industrial path followed by cities such as Montreal, Toronto and Hamilton. It is 
76 Halifax Board of Trade, The Forty-First Annual Report, p. 11. 
77 For a general discussion of bonusing in Canada during the late nineteenth century, see T. 
Naylor, The History of Canadian Business, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1975), pp. 120-61. 
78 These problems are constantly referred to in the Halifax press and also in the annual reports of 
the city. Despite the validity of these facts, the city was often subjected to criticism: "Inquiries 
regarding what inducements the City would give to new industries to locate here have been 
received on a number of occasions during the year, but as the City had no definite policy in this 
"respect until recently, it has been found difficult to offset the inducements such as bonuses, 
exemptions, etc. that have been offered at other points". Halifax Board of Trade, The 
Forty-Seventh Annual Report of the Halifax Board of Trade for the Year 1912 (Halifax, 1912), 
p. 24. 
79 "City Assessor's Report for 1911-12", Annual Report of the City of Halifax 1911-12 (Halifax, 
1912), p. 115. 
80 "Mayor's Address", Annual Report of the City of Halifax, 1884-85 (Halifax, 1885), pp. xii-xiii 
and xxv; and "Mayor's Address", Annual Report of the City of Halifax, 1885-86 (Halifax, 
1886), pp. lviii-lix. 
81 "Mayor's Address", Annual Report of the City of Halifax, 1907-08 (Halifax, 1908), pp. 13-4 
and 31. 
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apparent, for example, that staple commodities have had only a marginal 
impact on manufacturing in Halifax. Their dispersed regional pattern, their 
weak endowment, and their limited processing requirements are very visible 
reasons for its failure to become an industrialized entrepôt. The economy of 
Halifax was also seriously weakened by the marketing and production problems 
created by the heartland-hinterland process. The metropolitan economy had 
little need for goods manufactured at the margin because its own industrial base 
produced and marketed more competitively the same products that could be 
produced in the Maritimes. Compounding these problems the heartland even 
managed to submerge and lure away vital regional industries. This centripetal 
force also siphoned Halifax's banking community away from its hinterland 
source early in the twentieth century. The forces of continentalism were difficult 
to overcome. 
As a consequence of these problems, Halifax was forced to depend increas-
ingly upon the government extension of the metropolitan economy for stimulat-
ing its urban economy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
city emerged as an important defence, trade and transportation centre.82 The 
predominantly federal responsibility for international trade, national defence, 
and railroad and port development fell upon this outpost of "Empire Canada". 
With the opening of the Canadian West, the federal government strengthened 
the port and the rail functions of Halifax so that it could handle the reciprocal 
movement of immigrants and grain. The government also strengthened the 
defence function. The increase was slow at first, especially after the withdrawal 
of the British forces in 1905, but it blossomed dramatically after the outbreak of 
war in 1914. The government stimulus during this period supplemented the 
weakening industrial base. Today, such federally supported areas as defence, 
transportation, research and public services are a mainstay of the local 
economy. Halifax has failed as an industrial city because it functions at the 
margin. It is only an intermediary, highly dependent upon a metropolitan 
economy. 
82 REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LOCATION QUOTIENTS FOR SELECTED 
ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF HALIFAX, 1881 and 1911 
Manufacturing 
Trade 
Transportation 
Finance 
Government 
18 
Regional 
1.04 
3.36 
1.50 
2.84 
3.00 
81 
National 
.79 
1.36 
1.53 
1.42 
5.25 
1911 
Regional 
1.38 
2.83 
2.12 
2.66 
5.52 
Nation 
1.14 
2.22 
1.67 
1.84 
4.23 
Sources: Calculated from labour force data in Canada, Census of Canada, 1881,\o\. 2, Table 
14; and Canada, Census of Canada, 1911 vol. 6, Table 6. 
